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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Evidence-Income Tax Returns-Admissibility
In Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.1 the plaintiff claimed damages
to his property and business due to the negligence of defendant. For
purposes of contradicting plaintiff's testimony as to amount of damages,
defendant introduced plaintiff's federal income tax return for the period
during which plaintiff claimed he was damaged, and it was allowed in
2
evidence over objections.
The purpose of this note is a brief investigation of the propriety and
usefulness of income tax returns as evidence, in civil cases, of income,
profit, loss, or other matter reported therein.
Anything that a party has said, if relevant, is admissible against him
as an admission s to be considered by the jury. And the admission by
an employee or agent, acting within the scope of his authority, is admissible against the principal. 4 Declarations by a takpayer on personal
property tax lists are admissible against him on the issue of the value
of the property; though real property valuations for tax purposes are
held not to be admissions, since they are made by an independent third
party.5 It seems logically to follow that a party's declaration in his
income tax return as to his income, or any other matter contained
therein, would be admissible against him as an admission; and this would
follow whether the return is made out by the party himself, or by
someone employed by him for that purpose.( Such an admission would,
of course, not be conclusive, but merely evidence for the consideration
of the jury, and may be explained or shown to have been the result, of
7
mistake.
When it becomes desirable for purposes of impeachment to show
that an opponent's income is less than claimed in his testimony, his
income tax return would seehi generally to be the practical source for
the purpose; except in an unusual instance the party will have minimized
227 N. C. 561, 42 S.E. 2d 905 (1947).
'In this case the plaintiff's income tax return showed that he had reported
therein his income for the period at an even lower figure than he claimed in his
testimony. He objected that the effect of the introduction was to discredit him
in the eyes of the jury as criminally evading the Federal Income Tax Laws. The
court held it competent for the purpose of contradiction of his testimony "since
it is a plain contradiction as to his testimony about his income."
'Stone v. Guion, 222 N. C. 548, 23 S. E. 2d 907 (1943); McDonald v. Carson,
95 N. C. 377 (1886) ; Curlee v. Smith, 91 N. C. 172 (1884); Tredwell v. Graham,
88 N. C. 208 (1883); STANSBtRY, NORTH CAROLINA LAw OF EVIDENCE §167
(1946) ; see also, Kauffman v. Meyberg, 140 P. 2d 210 (Cal. 1943) (income tax
return admitted to contradict party's testimony concerning the items reported
therein).
'WIGIORE, EVIDENCE §1078 (3rd ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§§156, 168, 169.
' Star Manufacturing Co. v. R. R., 222 N. C. 330, 23 S. E. 2d 32 (1942) ; Daniels v. Fowler, 123 N. C. 35, 31 S. E. 598 (1898).
See note 4 supra.
* Cheek v. Lumber Co., 134 N. C. 225, 46 S. E. 488, 47 S. E. 400 (1904);
Eason v. Sutton, 20 N. C. 622 (1839) ; STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §167.
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his income in reporting it for tax purposes, at least to the extent legally
possible. Or when seeking to show that an opponent's income is greater
than claimed in his testimony, even if his income tax return shows an
income less than testified to, it might be advantageous to introduce it
for the purpose of contradicting him, and at the same time to discredit
him in the eyes of the jury as having evaded the income tax laws. Under
authority of the principal case s this purpose is not objectionable so long
as it does contradict the party's testimony. 9
The simplicity of introduction of the one document and the practical
certainty that income will be at the lowest possible figure, or expenses
at the highest, are the obvious advantages in the use of an opponent's
income tax return over the use of his books of account. And in the
case of a party who maintains no accounting records, his income tax
return is of primary importance as admissions of the items contained
therein.
There would seem to be no particular difficulty in obtaining a.copy
of a party's income tax return through the process of a subpoena duces
tecum;1°0 and the return would probably be admissible even though
wrongfully obtained,"1 though such a practice is not here advocated.
Also there may be a possibility of obtaining a certified copy of the
party's state income tax return from the office of the state commissioner
of revenue,' 2 though it seems impossible to obtain in this manner a
copy of his federal income tax return.13
Where a party wishes to introduce his own income tax return in
evidence, he may introduce it to corroborate his testimony as to his
income, or other matter reported ;14 and, in North Carolina at least, it
would not be error if it were admitted even before the party testified. 15
Also he may use the tax return to "refresh his recollection" as to the
matter reported there ;: or he may. introduce the tax return as "recorded
Davis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 227 N. C. 561, 42 S. E. 2d 905 (1947).
Id.at 566, 42 S. E. 2d at 909. However,- when introduced for such a purpose it seems -open to the objection that its only effect is to excite prejudice. See
STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §80.
'ON. C. GEN. STAr. (1943) §8-89; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §8-90; FED. R.
COv. P., 34.

" Cf. Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513 (1875); Hernandez v. Brookdale Mills,

201 App. Div. 324 (1922); WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2183; the only cases found in
the North Carolina Digest were criminal cases which are adequately reviewed in
State v. Joe McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S.E. 616 (1938); see also STANSBURY,
op. cit. s-upra, note 3, §121. Surely if evidence wrongfully obtained is competent

in criminal
cases, there can be no doubt of its competency in civil cases.
2
1

N. C. GEN.

STAT.

(1943) §8-61; a liberal construction of the statute wvould

be necessary, and it seems at least doubtful that such a construction would be
given; see also, N. C. GFN. STAT, (1943) §105-259.
'26 U. S. C. A. §55.
See STANSBURY, Op. cit. supra, note 3, §51.
State v. Sutton, 225 N. C. 332, 34 S.E. 2d 195 (1945) ; State v. Freeman,
100 N. C. 429, 5 S.E. 921 (1888) ; State v. Twitty, 9 N. C. 449 (1823).
14

STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note'3, §32, and cases there cited.
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past recollection" of the matter reported there when he is unable to
recall to mind the information sought to be elicited.17
Should it become desirable for a party to introduce his own income
tax return as substantive evidence of income, expenses, profit, loss, or
any other matter contained therein, it may be possible to introduce it
as secondary evidence of the contents of the party's "business records."' 8
In such case the burden would be upon the proponent to satisfactorily
account for his failure to produce his books of account themselves. 9
For example, this requirement might be satisfied by showing that. the
regular business records have been lost or destroyed,20 or maybe by
showing that the regular business records are so voluminous as to be
impractical to bring into court or present to the jury;21 or maybe by
showing that a bringing of the records themselves into court would
seriously delay and hamper the operation of the business.2 2 Any of
these seem to be sound and practical reasons for non-production of the
original records, and adequate grounds for admitting the secondary
evidence. Particularly would this seem true when viewed in light of
the fact that the income tax return is made out as much as a matter of
regular business as the ledgers themselves-it is, theoretically at least,
an accurate summary of the business records. However, in the case
of a small business, where the tax return has been prepared by the proponent himself, the opposing party might successfully object to its
introduction on the ground that it may not properly reflect the contents
of the original records because of the incentive to minimize income and
maximize expense when reporting for tax purposes. But this objection
would not be forceful in the case of a large business concern where
the return is generally made up by a disinterested third person whose
only incentive is to be accurate.
In the case of a party who maintains no accounting records, in the
light of the nqodern view as to admissibility of entries made in the
1 See discussion in STAxsBuRY, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§33.
" For discussion of "entries in regular course of business" as an exception to
the rule against hearsay, see WIGMoRE, EviDENC §1517 et seq. (3rd ed. 1940);
STANsBtU,

op. cit. supra, note 3, §155.

" Mahoney-Jones Co. v. Osborne, 189 N. C. 445, 127 S. E. 533 (1925); see

op. cit. supra, note 3, §§190-194 for discussion of "best evidence rule."
Cf. American Potato Co. v. Jenriette Bros Co., 174 N. C. 236, 93 S. E. 795

STANSBURY,
20

(1917); Smith v. R. R., 68 N. C. 107 (1873); Gathings v. Williams, 27 N. C.
487 (1845).
'IIn J. A. Laporte Corp. v. Pennsylvania-Dixie Cement Corp., 164 Md. 642,
165 Atl. 195, 168 At. 844 (1933), it was intimated that compilations from ponderous
books, even where expressly made up for purposes of the trial, were admissible
without the originals, defendant's protection being "by resort to a previous ex-

amination of the final book entries, or by an account from them."

" Cf. Washington Horse Exch. v. Wilson, 152 N. C. 21, 67 S. E. 35 (1910)
(witness who had examined the voluminous records was permitted to testify as

to the results without bringing the records into court). It seems that a summary
by way of an income tax return, prepared after examination of the business
records, would be equally as competent to show' the contents.
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regular course of business,2 3 the possibility of allowance of his income
tax return into evidence as an "entry in the regular course of business"
seems at least worthy of mention. The fact that the tax return is required by law should not detract from its quality of having been prepared in the regular course of business; but in point of fime, the
business transactions are in such case possibly recorded too late to
qualify as having been made in the regular course of business 24-the
income tax return records transactions as much as a year after their
occurrence.
There is the possibility of an objection against a party seeking to
introduce his own income tax return as substantive evidence on the
grounds that it is "self-serving." 25 This would not be a valid objection,
however, if it has been qualified under some one of the exceptions to
the rule against hearsay; because, unless the evidence is inadmissible
under some hearsay rule, the fact that it is self-serving is not an inde26
pendent ground for objection.
Suppose that it became necessary or desirable to introduce the income tax return of a third party, would it be admissible when relevant?
To avoid exclusion under the rule against hearsay, the requirements of
a declaration against interest (or admission by a predecessor in title,
discussed infra) must be met; i.e., the declarant must be dead, or for
some adequate reason be unavailable as a witness ;27 the fact stated
must have been against the declarantp interest at the time of the declaration, and he must have been conscious at the time that it was against
his interest.28 It would seem logically to follow that any taxable item set
forth in an income tax return would be a declaration against interest
because the declarant would thereby be rendered liable for the tax ;20
2'28 U. S. C. A. §695; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 514 (1942); STANsBuiY, op.
24 One

cit. supra,.note 3, §155.
of the common law requirements for admissibility of business records is
that they should have been made at or near the time of thd transaction. WiGMORE, EvIDEccE §1526. This requirement is also incorporated into the code of
evidence as adopted by the American Law Institute (see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 514 [1942]),,and into the federal Business Records Act (28 U. S. C. A. §695).
" Farmer v. Associated Professors of Loyola College, 166 Md. 455, 171 At.
361 (1934) (in suit to set aside alleged gifts of bonds, donor's income tax return
held to be a self-serving declaration, and not admissible to prove donor's belief
that shh still owned the bonds; qualification as entry in regular course of business
not argued) ; Clay v. Richardson, 38 S. W. 2d 849 (Texas 1931) (intimated that
plaintiff might not he allowed to introduce income tax return to show loss of
income over objection that it was self-serving; but here primary question was
failure of plaintiff to account satisfactorily for failure to produce his books).
2'STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §140.
27
Currin v. Currin, 219 N. C. 815, 15 S. E. 2d 279 (1941) ; Roe v. Journegan,
175 N. C. 261, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) ; Jones v. Henry, 84 N. C. 320 (1881) ; Woodhouse v. Simmons, 73 N. C. 30 (1875).
" Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918) ; STANsBURY, op. cit.
mpra, note 3, §147.
"' But see, In re Stratman's Estate, 231 Iowa 480, 1 N. W. 2d 636 (1942)
(complainants own assessment rolls showing money due from defendant held not
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and conversely, any item of expense or loss would not be against interest,
because the declarant's liability for taxes would thereby be lessened.
But such a general conclusion might be upset when applied to the
specific case.30 Suppose, for example, A purchased from B a thriving
resort hotel, and shortly thereafter B dies. In the meantime C has
started operating a rock quarry on the lot adjoining the hotel, and not
caring to mix the noise from the quarry with their afternon tea, practically all of A's clientele have abandoned him. A brings action against
C for damages, and desiring to show his loss of income he offered B's
income tax returns for the past several years. Are they admissible as
declarations against interest? It could be argued that since B had been
rendered liable for taxes by reporting his income in large amounts, that
it was a declaration against his interest. Could it not also be argued
that the large incomes reported enhanced the value of the property in
the eyes of A and enabled B to ask a higher price in the sale to A, so
that it was not against B's interest? The sounder argument would
seem in .favor of a declaration against interest, because it is extremely
unlikely that A relied on the income tax returns of B in arriving at his
decision as to what he would pay for the property; he would, rather,
depend on his inspection of the condition of the building and premises,
and the average number of patrons.
Suppose in the same fact set up, blasting from C's quarry had so
weakened the foundations of the hotel that the walls collapsed, and in
A's suit for damages, C seeks to introduce B's income tax return to
show the actual value of the building after depreciation over the period
of B's ownership. Is it admissible as a declaration against interest?
It could be argued that it is against interest, because by depreciating
the building B thus admitted its lowered value. But it could also be
argued that it is not against interest, because by so depreciating the
building B was able to introduce the depredation expense against his
income and thus reduce liability for income tax. The sounder argument here would seem to be in favor of holding it not against interest,
because the depreciated value of a building is seldom the basis upon
which a purchaser makes his offer. The offer would be based upon the
actual physical condition, so that B would not be declaring against his
interest to report the building at its depreciated value.
to be "admissions against interest" merely because they subjected complainant to
liability for taxes. Note, however, that the assessment rolls were those of a living
person available as a witness, and the exclusion may have been for that reason;
the decision is not clear on the point. Quaere, shouldn't it have been introduced,
as suggested heretofore, as corroborative evidence?).
30 It might conceivably be argued that the payment of taxes is for the mutual
benefit of society, and that, theoretically at least, the taxpayer will benefit from
paying his taxes, and thus declarations in a tax return rendering the declarant
liable for taxes could never be against his interest. However, his honor being
himself a taxpayer, may entertain doubts that are difficult to dispel.
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In evaluating the possibility of admissibility in each particular case,'
there are two important requirements which must not be overlooked; the
proponent of the evidence has the burden of showing that the declaration was in fact against interest, 81 and that the declarant believed it to
be against his interest ;32 both are necessary because, for example, should
the interest of the declarant be erroneously supposed by him to be served
by the statement which he is making, the latter is devoid of probative
force, although as the situation actually exists it is very much against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest. 33
In some rare case the income tax return of a third person (B)
might also be advantageously introduced against that third person's
successor in interest (A) as a "vicarious admission."8 4 The prerequisite
for the introduction of such evidence is a showing of privity between
A and B as successive holders of a title,36 that B made -the statement
while he was holder of the title, and that it could have been used against
B in litigation over his title.8 6 Contrary to the requirements of a "declaration against interest," here there is no need of a showing that the
declarant is dead, or that the declaration was against interest ;3T however,
such an admission is competent only against the successor in interest,
38
and not in his favor.
Civil cases involving the use of income tax returns as evidence seem
to be extremely limited in number, but with the requirement of tax
returns from practically everyone in the United States today, their
statements of their financial positions are thus opened to the possibility
of scrutiny; and it is not improbable that income tax returns will come
into use as evidence more and more.
WALTER E. BROCK, JR.
Insu'auce-Fraud and Materiality of RepresentationsStatutory Construction
The recent case of Carroll v. Carolina Casualty Ivs. Co.' serves to
illustrate the relatively confused interpretations that are found to exist

with respect to the short but sweeping North Carolina insurance statute2
See note 28 supra.
' 2 See note 28 supra.
"Roe v. Journegan, 175 N. C. 261 at 265, 95 S. E. 495 (1918) (quoting with
approval from 2 CHAMBLAYNE ON EVIDENCE §2782 [1913]).
" For discussion of "admissions by predecessors in interest," see STANSBURY,
op. cit. =pra,note 3, §174.
" Satterwhite v. Hicks, 44 N. C. 105 (1852); Guy v. Hall, 7 N. C. 150
(1819).
'* WIMORE, EVIDENCE §1081 (3rd ed. 1940); STANSBURY, Op. cit. supra, note
3, §174, and cases there cited.
"' STANSBURY, op. cit. supra, note 3, §174.
3

.'Roberts v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 29 (1880).

1227 N. C. 456, 42 S. E. 2d 607 (1947).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §58-30. *

